The future of U.S.-Russian relations

LooseGoose wrote:

NigelUno wrote:

So...you're saying the FBI confirms Russian attacks?

Please read post #85 before trying to play your silly gotcha game with me.

Turtleneck wrote:

Let's see if we can steer this thread back on track. It has veered into the weeds. If I am correct, there is another thread for the partisan "Russia hacked the election" talk.

You will have to be more specific when you say "Part of the reason NATO is eroding is precisely BECAUSE of the U.S.' disengagement and following courses of action not in line with our allies' interests." I am not sure I agree. First, the U.S. has maintained its financial commitment to NATO. Many of our NATO allies have not. NATO suggests defense expenditures for each member state be, at minimum, two percent of GDP. Only five NATO countries - U.S., U.K., Greece, Poland, Estonia - met the two percent threshold in 2015. Second, we have followed courses of action consistent with the wishes of our NATO allies. What immediately comes to mind is Libya, which was a "thank you" to those NATO allies who contributed to our efforts in Afghanistan. That is a very nice "thank you" if you ask me.

Reports of the White House debate over whether to join the Paris and London-led war party show that the Obama administration has been a reluctant participant from the start. One reason that the administration overcame its reluctance was to maintain the limited support that European NATO allies have provided to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. To repay them for their cooperation in the Hindu-Kush, the United States was compelled to support those European allies in North Africa.

In explaining why the United States was intervening in a country that was not a “vital interest,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted in late March: “We asked our allies, our NATO allies, to go into Afghanistan with us ten years ago. They have been there and a lot of them have been there despite the fact they were not attacked… They stuck with us. When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the U.K., France, Italy, other of our NATO allies. This was in their vital national interests.” This rationale has endured, with Secretary Gates acknowledging last week: “What was going on in Libya was considered a vital interest by some of our closest allies. Those are the same allies that have come to our support and assistance in Afghanistan. And so it seems to me the kind of limited measured role that the president decided on in support of our allies, who did consider it a vital interest, is a legitimate way to look at this problem.” Or, as Senators Joe Lieberman and Marco Rubio wrote yesterday: “American disengagement would also inflict irreparable damage on the NATO alliance…Having walked out on our European allies in the middle of a battle, we can expect them to do the same to us in Afghanistan.”

You're talking about the 2% of GDP should be on defense spending clause. That's true many of the NATO allies do not meet that criteria. And there has been some return to engagement with the NATO allies under President Obama, but since the mid 90s NATO has added, I think 12 countries? The shared vision of what the Alliance is has changed, some seem to think it's a humanitarian organization these days, including many in the U.S. It has lost it's way as an exclusively military alliance that should be very much about protecting Europe from Russian aggression. I personally think that the U.S. is as much to blame for this as anyone. As the strongest member, the U.S. can control the direction of the alliance, and instead of humanitarian and support missions in Iraq/Afghanistan/Lybia (referenced by your quotes above - look into what the allies' roles were), which serve to alienate the lesser allies by making the aim of the alliance appear diffuse, and not really focused on European security. So that's what I mean about not representing our allies' interests. The U.S. must reinvigorate NATO by refocusing it's mission and proving to our allies that we are committed to using it for what it's meant to do. Protect the European continent. Otherwise, member states will defect to the apparent strength of whatever it is Russia presents. I don't have a lot of links backing up this opinion, these are my own observations. I think the Strength that NATO used to project has been severely diminished and Putin has been exploiting that. Redoubling that projection of Strength soothes allies, and makes working with the alliance more attractive.

I think you will find disagreement in the foreign policy community regarding China. Your comments get right to the heart of that disagreement. Yes, our economies are interdependent and some believe that will temper relations between the two countries. However, others point to China's vast military modernization program - quantitative and qualitative improvements to conventional and nuclear forces - as evidence of greater ambitions.

I think you go too far in stating China desires "wholesale destruction" of the U.S. What China desires is something more strategically feasible, which is to dominate Asia and push the U.S. out of the region. Given their recent behavior in the South China Sea and how they have approached maritime disputes in general, it is important for the U.S. to remain committed to our Asian partners and allies. This means the U.S. cannot afford to focus on Russia at the expense of Asia.

You misread me. Addressed above.

To some extent, the conversation about China cannot simply be material in nature. Rising Chinese nationalism is an issue. The CPC has been selling nationalism as a means of legitimacy for quite some time. Nationalism replaced communism as the primary tool used to get people to continue to buy into one party rule. I do not really know where Chinese nationalism will take the country. Maybe nowhere, or maybe the CPC will lose control of the nationalism they have been manipulating for so long.

Nationalism has worked for Xi. So far, patriotic, mass support has protected him from a strong, public challenge by the military or the party. But nationalism in China has an uncertain and at times combustible relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leaders in Beijing. In China, street-level, unchecked nationalism—nationalism en masse—is a precarious threat both to the CCP and to regional and global stability overall.

I have little knowledge of internal Chinese politics, but I think the interwoven nature of the American and Chinese economic relationship would preclude the U.S. and China being on opposite sides of a hot conflict. Whatever happens internally, the current regime in China has similar global interests to the U.S., even if regionally we antagonize each other. This argument, I am the least informed on, admittedly. I'm just not that worried about China right now.

In regards to Russia specifically, I am not entirely in disagreement. I am not sure game theorists would agree with your assessment, and I am still not convinced you fully understand the nature of cooperation in international politics. Nonetheless, I think I would frame your concerns in the context of reputation costs. That each time the U.S. cooperates with Russia it make the U.S. look weak and harms our reputation.

Reputation costs are a legitimate concern. What does it say to our allies in Europe if we cooperate with Russia? Does it say we are not committed? I just made an argument for being committed to our allies in Asia so ideally the same logic should apply to Europe. However, I do not think cooperating on arms control measures is going to harm our reputation costs. Did the New START undermine the U.S. internationally? It was a brief talking point for Obama's critics at home, but it did not result in the rest of the world thinking the U.S was capitulating to Russia.

It's all about the visuals for me. Is arms control a worthy thing? Yes. Is it worth appearing as though we are trying to stem the flow of arms from the Russians to conflict zones because our interests are losing? Not in my opinion. At least not out in the open. And I suspect that any of that type of cooperation would be forced by the Russians to be out in the open so that they could trumpet their strength in leading such negotiations. Right now, I think we need to be treating Russia as an enemy. I think congress is starting to see that, even if the incoming administration never does.

I still think overextension is a concern that needs to be addressed. China is throwing its weight around in Asia. Our allies in that part of the world expect us to be credible in our commitments. If we are going to reinvest in Europe and balance Russian power, balance Chinese power in Asia, and deal with Middle Eastern issues, do we risk reaching that point where we simply cannot afford the costs of defending our interests and honoring our commitments at the same time?  I say this in light of a number of domestic issues that need to be addressed.

Our commitments in the middle east are secondary. Those resources can and should be shifted to Europe right now. Again, I am not really concerned about China at this time. They are attempting to expand their sphere of influence, but they are avoiding being overtly aggressive. Again, not my strongest point.

Nice conversation, Roc. Goood stuff. Thanks for posting in this thread.