Unpacking Uranium One: Hype and Law

The latest instance of "what-aboutism" is the House Republican decision to open an investigation of the Uranium One transaction—the allegation that Hillary Clinton transferred control of 20% of America's uranium mining output to a Russian company, in exchange for substantial contributions to the Clinton Foundation from the executives of that same Russian company. Perhaps fearing future revelations of Trump's closeness to Russia, the evident purpose of the investigation is to establish a "Hillary too" counterpoint. Based on what is currently in the public record, little, if anything about the allegation is plausible. In this post, I want to summarize the legal context and known facts regarding the transfer and put the allegations of impropriety in context. (I focus exclusively on the transfer and the U.S. government's approval of it. I am not, in this post, considering the evidence—such as it is—of donations to the Clinton Foundation. My reasoning is simple: if there is no "quo" to be given, the question of a "quid" is moot.)

Takeaways

What can we glean from all this?

It is unlikely that Secretary Clinton personally participated in the transaction. Her assistant secretary says she did not intervene, and given the nature of the transaction and the apparent lack of controversy, that is a plausible scenario. I can see no reason to doubt his account.

The structure of CFIUS is such that no one agency can control the outcome of the consideration. Here it appears that the entire committee and the NRC were all satisfied with the mitigation put in place. It is a very far stretch to lay this result at State's doorstep—the vigorous objection of any of the security-minded agencies would likely have derailed the transaction, but none, evidently was forthcoming. I have no doubt that State favored the sale—but that is likely the position it would take today under Secretary Rex Tillerson and was surely the position it would have taken under Secretaries Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice and John Kerry. State has a strong institutional bias in favor of accommodating foreign investment in the United States. Here, it seems clear that the Pentagon and DHS did not object either.

The inherent bias of the process is to approve transactions, with mitigation if needed. Intervention and blocking are rare and require more than a single agency to be activated. Put another way, no single agency has a veto on the transaction—the transaction goes forward unless a substantial majority of CFIUS is motivated by grave concerns to block it. So the most accurate way to characterize this case is that State, along with all the other agencies, declined to recommend a presidential veto.

Uranium One's licenses are for mining and extraction, not for export. This makes the claim that we "gave away" 20% of America's uranium fairly hyperbolic. The expectation, in light of the NRC's assessment, would have been that the uranium mined would be marketed in America (with the profits going to Russia).

It is, however, true, that the mining rights to 20% of American uranium are now held by a Russian state agency. That is troubling (and had it been me, I would have tried to generate opposition to the sale). It isn't a "give away," but it is the case that Rusatom has de jure and de facto legal rights that can be exercised to limit production if it wishes to do so.

Travis of the Cosmos wrote:Lock her up turtleneck

Turtleneck wrote:

Travis of the Cosmos wrote:Lock her up turtleneck

I think it is easier to just say that than familiarize yourself with process.

In the face of repeated fact checks, the president's claims have not withstood scrutiny. The president's critics call them part of an effort to divert attention from Justice Department special counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into possible collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia.

But because the story keeps surfacing and key Republicans are calling for hearings, here is a closer look.

Rocinante wrote:Actually I probably said it during he campaign.