North Korea: Preventative attack or learn to live with a nuclear north?

The choice then will be to either adapt or fight (air strikes). The United States did adapt (post-Cuba) to a Soviet ability to nuke the U.S. homeland and, more generally, it has lived with Soviet/Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrence for decades.

I have previously argued that North Korea probably does not want to attack the United States. Its officials have repeatedly told the world that it seeks nuclear weapons to prevent American-led regime change on the model of Iraq or Libya. Indeed, the United States is a pretty obvious threat to the North Korean leadership. The United States has sought to isolate North Korea for decades, threatened it with a major war in 1994, placed it on an “axis of evil” in 2001, lead the sanctions charge in the ensuing years, and so on. It is not, therefore, surprising that North Korea has sought nuclear weapons like other various rogue nations, such as Hussein’s Iraq, Iran, Syria, Qaddafi’s Libya and apartheid South Africa.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/will-america-wage-war-nuclear-armed-north-korea-21279

How many South Koreans and US military personnel casulaties become part of the pre-emptive attack

Seoul is 121 miles south from North Korea's capital Pyongyang and Kaesong NK is just 36 miles from Seoul.

Seoul's population is 10.4M. About 500,000 more people living there than live in MI. There are also around 29,000 active duty US military plus dependents stationed in South Korea. A majority within 50 miles f the DMZ.

The US best play is to have Trump keep his mouth shut and allow experienced people work with S. Korea and China for a regime change. A Chinese style government is acceptable to what they currently have.

GRR Spartan wrote:How many South Koreans and US military personnel casulaties become part of the pre-emptive attack

Seoul is 121 miles south from North Korea's capital Pyongyang and Kaesong NK is just 36 miles from Seoul.

Seoul's population is 10.4M. About 500,000 more people living there than live in MI. There are also around 29,000 active duty US military plus dependents stationed in South Korea. A majority within 50 miles f the DMZ.

The US best play is to have Trump keep his mouth shut and allow experienced people work with S. Korea and China for a regime change. A Chinese style government is acceptable to what they currently have.

Yeah, this is not a decision that the US can make alone by any means, and the tone of that article is a bit disturbing in it's apparent disregard of this fact. It's entirely about "should the US attack NK before they can make a missile to reach the US?" Well, they have a missile now that deliver a nuke to two of our best allies in the world, Japan and South Korea.

The historical examples in the article are absurd, as well. First and foremost, it was the Soviet Union we're talking about. The world's other superpower. Pretty much every aspect of our foreign policy (overt and covert), in dozens of countries across 6 continents (forces in Europe, the Korean War, Vietnam, South America, Cuba, helping Bin Laden, etc.), was all dedicated to countering the Soviets. To use any events of the Cold War as a comparison to North Korea now is silly. The Cuban Missile Crisis only put the US at risk, not an ally 10,000 miles away? Pearl Harbor and 9/11? As awful as those were, those were mere mosquito bites compared to the what the Russian Bear or North Korean rabid dog could/can do.

MiamiSpartan wrote:

GRR Spartan wrote:How many South Koreans and US military personnel casulaties become part of the pre-emptive attack

Seoul is 121 miles south from North Korea's capital Pyongyang and Kaesong NK is just 36 miles from Seoul.

Seoul's population is 10.4M. About 500,000 more people living there than live in MI.  There are also around 29,000 active duty US military plus dependents stationed in South Korea.  A majority within 50 miles f the DMZ.

The US best play is to have Trump keep his mouth shut and allow experienced people work with S. Korea and China for a regime change.  A Chinese style government is acceptable to what they currently have.

Yeah, this is not a decision that the US can make alone by any means, and the tone of that article is a bit disturbing in it's apparent disregard of this fact.  It's entirely about "should the US attack NK before they can make a missile to reach the US?"  Well, they have a missile now that deliver a nuke to two of our best allies in the world, Japan and South Korea.  

The historical examples in the article are absurd, as well.  First and foremost, it was the Soviet Union we're talking about.  The world's other superpower.  Pretty much every aspect of our foreign policy (overt and covert), in dozens of countries across 6 continents (forces in Europe, the Korean War, Vietnam, South America, Cuba, helping Bin Laden, etc.), was all dedicated to countering the Soviets.  To use any events of the Cold War as a comparison to North Korea now is silly.  The Cuban Missile Crisis only put the US at risk, not an ally 10,000 miles away?  Pearl Harbor and 9/11?  As awful as those were, those were mere mosquito bites compared to the what the Russian Bear or North Korean rabid dog could/can do.

I understand why you would say they are absurd, but I think you read too far into his examples.

The point of the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis was to illustrate previous U.S. responses to disruptions in the balance of power, or what he referred to as "Major strategic changes." When the Soviets moved missiles to Cuba, the U.S. saw it as a disruption to the existing balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. He is arguing that the U.S. would likely see a North Korean "nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which could strike the U.S. homeland" in the same way.

Interestingly, he briefly argues Soviet missiles in Cuba was the Soviets trying to establish nuclear parity with the U.S. rather than a nuclear advantage. Similarly, he thinks North Korea is seeking long-range capabilities for defensive purposes rather than offensive. He weaves in the other two examples to further illustrate how the U.S. tends to respond, but in this case says it would be a mistake; we can live with a nuclear North Korea.

I am sure he is well aware of North Korea's ability to strike the South. He lives in South Korea.

Turtleneck wrote:

MiamiSpartan wrote:
Yeah, this is not a decision that the US can make alone by any means, and the tone of that article is a bit disturbing in it's apparent disregard of this fact.  It's entirely about "should the US attack NK before they can make a missile to reach the US?"  Well, they have a missile now that deliver a nuke to two of our best allies in the world, Japan and South Korea.  

The historical examples in the article are absurd, as well.  First and foremost, it was the Soviet Union we're talking about.  The world's other superpower.  Pretty much every aspect of our foreign policy (overt and covert), in dozens of countries across 6 continents (forces in Europe, the Korean War, Vietnam, South America, Cuba, helping Bin Laden, etc.), was all dedicated to countering the Soviets.  To use any events of the Cold War as a comparison to North Korea now is silly.  The Cuban Missile Crisis only put the US at risk, not an ally 10,000 miles away?  Pearl Harbor and 9/11?  As awful as those were, those were mere mosquito bites compared to the what the Russian Bear or North Korean rabid dog could/can do.

I understand why you would say they are absurd, but I think you read too far into his examples.

The point of the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis was to illustrate previous U.S. responses to disruptions in the balance of power, or what he referred to as "Major strategic changes." When the Soviets moved missiles to Cuba, the U.S. saw it as a disruption to the existing balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. He is arguing that the U.S. would likely see a North Korean "nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which could strike the U.S. homeland" in the same way.

I get what his point was with the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis, but it was a bad analogy because the main opposing player (Soviets) were who our foreign policy revolved around, because our own necks were on the line, and because our response was very different than the two options that he talks about for NK (both of which were thoroughly discussed and rejected by Kennedy). If his point is just that, when there are "major strategic changes", that we could react in any of a variety of different ways, well, I guess he's right. Kind of stating the obvious though, isn't it?

Turtleneck wrote:Interestingly, he briefly argues Soviet missiles in Cuba was the Soviets trying to establish nuclear parity with the U.S. rather than a nuclear advantage. Similarly, he thinks North Korea is seeking long-range capabilities for defensive purposes rather than offensive. He weaves in the other two examples to further illustrate how the U.S. tends to respond, but in this case says it would be a mistake; we can live with a nuclear North Korea.

You find it interesting that he re-states what every book, article, documentary, etc. on the crisis have been saying for 55 years. Ok.

Turtleneck wrote:I am sure he is well aware of North Korea's ability to strike the South. He lives in South Korea.

I didn't say he's not aware of their ability to strike the South, but he doesn't address that at all, which should be the single most important factor to consider when talking about striking North Korea. Chances are, if we launch a conventional strike on North Korea, they'll get a missile off and a nuke explodes in South Korea. If his point is that we shouldn't strike NK first, then how do you not mention the potential deaths of millions as the most important reason not to?

MiamiSpartan wrote:

Turtleneck wrote:

I understand why you would say they are absurd, but I think you read too far into his examples.

The point of the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis was to illustrate previous U.S. responses to disruptions in the balance of power, or what he referred to as "Major strategic changes." When the Soviets moved missiles to Cuba, the U.S. saw it as a disruption to the existing balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. He is arguing that the U.S. would likely see a North Korean "nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which could strike the U.S. homeland" in the same way.

I get what his point was with the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis, but it was a bad analogy because the main opposing player (Soviets) were who our foreign policy revolved around, because our own necks were on the line, and because our response was very different than the two options that he talks about for NK (both of which were thoroughly discussed and rejected by Kennedy).  If his point is just that, when there are "major strategic changes", that we could react in any of a variety of different ways, well, I guess he's right.  Kind of stating the obvious though, isn't it?

Turtleneck wrote:Interestingly, he briefly argues Soviet missiles in Cuba was the Soviets trying to establish nuclear parity with the U.S. rather than a nuclear advantage. Similarly, he thinks North Korea is seeking long-range capabilities for defensive purposes rather than offensive. He weaves in the other two examples to further illustrate how the U.S. tends to respond, but in this case says it would be a mistake; we can live with a nuclear North Korea.

You find it interesting that he re-states what every book, article, documentary, etc. on the crisis have been saying for 55 years.  Ok.

Turtleneck wrote:I am sure he is well aware of North Korea's ability to strike the South. He lives in South Korea.

I didn't say he's not aware of their ability to strike the South, but he doesn't address that at all, which should be the single most important factor to consider when talking about striking North Korea.  Chances are, if we launch a conventional strike on North Korea, they'll get a missile off and a nuke explodes in South Korea.  If his point is that we shouldn't strike NK first, then how do you not mention the potential deaths of millions as the most important reason not to?

As I said above, I understand your point about the Cuban Missile Crisis being an "absurd" example, but think you are reading into it too broadly. You are right. It is incredibly difficult to separate the Cuban Missile Crisis from the broader context of the Cold War. However, I think he is drawing on some basic theories and concepts from international politics (but trying not to be overly academic).

For starters, I think he is making reference to the concepts of deterrence and compellence when comparing the North Korea situation to the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, verbal threats had no credibility with the Soviets. Once the missiles were in Cuba, the U.S. had no ability to deter the Soviets and could only hope to compel them to remove the missiles. As you correctly point out, Kennedy and his staff ran through several options. Kennedy was initially drawn to an air strike, but understood the complexity of the situation. Eventually Kennedy saw the blockade as the best option. The blockade stood the best chance of compelling the Soviets to remove the missiles. It raised the states, but within reason.

I can see the parallel to North Korea. Not broadly, but specifically how both cases relate to deterrence and compellence in international politics. Can the U.S. truly deter North Korea at this point? Verbal threats will not work, and if missiles launched into Syria, or the MOAB drop in Afghanistan were meant to communicate a message to North Korea, they did not work. So the U.S. must now try to compel North Korea. What will that look like?

The interesting point was that  although the missiles in Cuba were an attempt to establish parity, the Kennedy administration saw it is a shift in the balance of power away from the U.S. and toward the Soviets. While the missiles in Cuba did not give the Soviets a "splendid first strike" advantage, the Kennedy administration saw fit to react in a way that raised the stakes of the game as a means of compelling the Soviets to remove the missiles.  Today, the Trump administration likely sees expanding North Korean capabilities similarly, that they disrupt the status quo significantly. North Korea being able to hit the U.S. does not give them first strike advantage, but it is still enough for the U.S. to react similarly as it did during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

To steal from Thomas Schelling's influential Arms and Influence, "The problem was to prove to the Russians that a potentially dangerous action was forthcoming, without any confidence that verbal threats would be persuasive and without any desire to initiate some irreversible process just to prove, to everybody's grief, that the United States meant what it said." I can see parallels with the North Korean situation today. I think the author was stating that based on history we should expect the U.S. to react similarly to 1962. However, he is also saying that is probably unwarranted. Raising the stakes in this case is unnecessary.

As for the South Korea issue you raise. I really do not know, Maybe he thinks it is a given. Maybe he is looking at this through the lens of the current administration. I really do not know, but it is a fair point to raise.

Major difference between Cuba in 1962 and North Korea in 2017 is the rockets (delivery system) and the warheads are owned by North Korea. In 1962 it was a relatively new Cuban government and Kennedy correctly guessed that the USSR didn't want to bet the farm on Castro while they still controlled the missiles and warheads.

Dear Leader is bat crazy.

GRR Spartan wrote:Major difference between Cuba in 1962 and North Korea in 2017 is the rockets (delivery system) and the warheads are owned by North Korea. In 1962 it was a relatively new Cuban government and Kennedy correctly guessed that the USSR didn't want to bet the farm on Castro while they still controlled the missiles and warheads.

Dear Leader is bat crazy.

He is crazy, you are right, but rational in the sense that his end game is probably regime survival. However, he is not as cunning as his father and not a skilled button pusher. He might be playing the game wrong.

TOP FORMER US OFFICIALS URGE PRESIDENT TRUMP TO BEGIN TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA

Six prominent former US government officials sent a letter today to President Donald Trump urging him to begin discussions with North Korea over its nascent nuclear weapons program. Given the absence of a viable military option, they wrote, it is critical to establish communication “to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.”

Robert Gallucci was chief US negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994. The Agreed Framework that resulted from those negotiations stopped North Korea’s production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. From 1998 to 2001, he served as special envoy for the State Department, addressing the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Siegfried Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security. He served as the fifth director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 to 1997. An expert on North Korea’s nuclear program, he has visited North Korea seven times since 2004. He is one of the few Western scientists to have seen a sample of North Korea’s plutonium and visited its centrifuge facility, which can produce highly enriched, weapon-grade uranium.

Richard Lugar was a US senator from 1977 until 2013, serving twice as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. During his time in the Senate he was a leader on nuclear weapons and arms control issues. He continues to work on security issues, including North Korea, through the Lugar Center, which he started after leaving the Senate.

William Perry served as secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton from 1994 to 1997 and deputy secretary of defense from 1993 to 1994. He was closely involved with negotiating and implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. In 1999, he visited North Korea as President Clinton’s special envoy, and served as a special advisor to the president and the secretary of state on North Korean affairs. He continues to follow and write about North Korea and other nuclear issues.

Bill Richardson has visited North Korea on many occasions since the early 1990s. During those trips, he met with North Korean officials to discuss its military programs and helped negotiate the release of US citizens detained by North Korea. A former US Congressman (1982 to1996), Ambassador to the United Nations (1997 to1998), and Governor of New Mexico (2003 to 2011), he now works on these issues in part through the Richardson Center for Global Engagement.

George Shultz served as secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan from 1982 to 1989. In that position, he played a key role in implementing a foreign policy that led to the end of the Cold War and the development of strong relationships between the United States and Asia-Pacific nations. He continues to work on security issues and in 2007 created the Nuclear Security Project with William Perry, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Senator Sam Nunn.

http://www.wjperryproject.org/notes-from-the-brink/top-former-us-officials-urge-president-trump-to-begin-talks-with-north-korea

North Korea's ICBM Test Isn't a Game Changer
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-koreas-icbm-test-isnt-game-changer-21420

Some good primers on North Korean missile technologies and capabilities

A rundown of North Korean missile tech and capabilities
https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/

North Korea’s Military Capabilities
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities?utm_medium=social_earned&utm_source=tw&utm_campaign=backgrounder&utm_term=north-koreas-military-capabilities&utm_content=062617

The US had a clear shot at killing Kim Jong Un on July 4 — here's why it didn't strike



Video appears to show Kim Jong Un casually smoking next to an untested liquid-fueled missile

LooseGoose wrote:The US had a clear shot at killing Kim Jong Un on July 4 — here's why it didn't strike



Video appears to show Kim Jong Un casually smoking next to an untested liquid-fueled missile

Is that picture from your property in Mio, Goose?

Turtleneck wrote:

LooseGoose wrote:The US had a clear shot at killing Kim Jong Un on July 4 — here's why it didn't strike



Video appears to show Kim Jong Un casually smoking next to an untested liquid-fueled missile

Is that picture from your property in Mio, Goose?

Yes, That's Mt Tom in the background.

Rocket was probably traveling and was due to be fueled ar a different site.

Dear Leader has enough enemies he is savy enough to keep lit cigarettes away from fully fueled rockets.

That is GreenWay climbing around the back trying to look important so Goose does not feed him to the dogs.

There will be war between the United States and North Korea over the rogue nation's missile program if it continues to aim intercontinental ballistic missiles at America, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said President Donald Trump has told him.

"He has told me that. I believe him," the lawmaker said Tuesday on TODAY. "If I were China, I would believe him, too, and do something about it."

http://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/sen-lindsey-graham-trump-says-war-north-korea-option-n788396?cid=sm_npd_nn_tw_ma

Trump made the mistake of badmouthing China after they granted patents to his daughter.

The US needs China to be the arbitor.

The other issue is Trump didn't think the Congress would pass a tough Russian sanctions bill that denys him the ability to selectively enforce or eliminate provisions. Now Putin knows big talk Trump is just that. The rub is Putin has shown a greater support toward N. Korea.

Alex Kaplan‏
@AlKapDC
Sebastian Gorka asked on Fox what Trump can do to pressure China over North Korea. Gorka: "We have the president's Twitter feed."

Adam Mount‏ @ajmount 3h3 hours ago
Adam Mount Retweeted Alex Kaplan
If you watch, it is clear that Gorka was not taken out of context & not kidding. Part of the WH thinks Trump will stop N.Korea with twitter.

Malware campaigns hit North Korea following nuclear ICBM tests

Researchers have stitched together two sophisticated malware campaigns that are targeting North Korea, raising suspicion over counteractions tied to the country’s aggressive weapons testing.

Cybersecurity researchers from Cylance released a report Tuesday asserting that Konni, a recently discovered but long active family of remote access trojans, was used in a malware campaign targeting North Korea shortly after a July 3 missile test. It marks the fifth known Konni campaign in three years and the third in 2017.

This follows similar reports from the firm Talos that showed a Konni campaign launched just a day after missile tests on July 4.

I'm still stunned this has all happened.....I remember when it was unpossible.

LooseGoose wrote:I'm still stunned this has all happened.....I remember when it was unpossible.

What would you have done in 1994, Loose?

William J. Perry‏Verified account @SecDef19 35m35 minutes ago
Nuclear deterrence is only effective if threats are deemed credible, bluster hurts our national security posture

LooseGoose wrote:I'm still stunned this has all happened.....I remember when it was unpossible.

How many times has DPRK used nukes in the past 23 years, Goose? Massive presidential failures on WJC, GWB, and BHO. Finally, after 6+ months in office, we have a president who will have the balls to nuke those fuckers. Never mind they'll get to use their one or two against us or our allies.

Betcha Donnie's nips got hard when he talked about fire and fury.

Turtleneck wrote:

LooseGoose wrote:I'm still stunned this has all happened.....I remember when it was unpossible.

What would you have done in 1994, Loose?

Taken a much firmer line. This nut's predecessors were more sane and weaker militarily.


If they wouldn't allow verification then take him out. And that's exactly the criticism of Clinton then - not strong enough on verifying...

LooseGoose wrote:

Turtleneck wrote:

What would you have done in 1994, Loose?

Taken a much firmer line. This nut's predecessors were more sane and weaker militarily.


If they wouldn't allow verification then take him out. And that's exactly the criticism of Clinton then - not strong enough on verifying...

Such as...

Talks about North Korea in this 1999 interview. Starts around 8:30 mark.

Doesn't sound like a great time to be visiting Guam.

Floyd Robertson wrote:Doesn't sound like a great time to be visiting Guam.

Shut up, Floyd. I just booked a flight to Guam for Travis. All of his mod work should be rewarded with a nice, relaxing vacation in Guam.

Turtleneck wrote:

Floyd Robertson wrote:Doesn't sound like a great time to be visiting Guam.

Shut up, Floyd. I just booked a flight to Guam for Travis. All of his mod work should be rewarded with a nice, relaxing vacation in Guam.

Aww thanks tn!!!

Turtleneck wrote:

LooseGoose wrote:

Taken a much firmer line. This nut's predecessors were more sane and weaker militarily.


If they wouldn't allow verification then take him out. And that's exactly the criticism of Clinton then - not strong enough on verifying...

Such as...

Water under the bridge now....but supposedly that deal was to stop Nuclear activity. they didn't. The deal wasn't enforced. they learned from that our threats meant nothing.

If it is water under the bridge, why are you posting about it? If it is water under the bridge, why are you attributing NK nuclear ambitions under different leadership to this deal?

Turtleneck wrote:If it is water under the bridge, why are you posting about it? If it is water under the bridge, why are you attributing NK nuclear ambitions under different leadership to this deal?

I'm posting about it because it's part of the history that got us here. Sorry if being informed offends you.